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ABSTRACT
Today’s state-of-the-art image classiers fail to correctly classify
carefully manipulated adversarial images. In this work, we develop
a new, localized adversarial aack that generates adversarial exam-
ples by imperceptibly altering the backgrounds of normal images.
We rst use this aack to highlight the unnecessary sensitivity of
neural networks to changes in the background of an image, then
use it as part of a new training technique: localized adversarial
training. By including locally adversarial images in the training
set, we are able to create a classier that suers less loss than a
non-adversarially trained counterpart model on both natural and
adversarial inputs. e evaluation of our localized adversarial train-
ing algorithm on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets shows decreased
accuracy loss on natural images, and increased robustness against
adversarial inputs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of machine learning to the eld of computer vision,
image classication soware has surpassed human capabilities and
enabled new technologies including facial recognition authentica-
tion, self-driving cars, and smart security cameras [1]. However,
a unique challenge threatens these technologies: the existence of
images which appear normal to humans, but reliably fool image
classiers [19]. Because convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
tend to focus on minor and easily manipulated details, aacks such
as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5], and its iterative coun-
terpart, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [7], have been able to
reliably generate such adversarial examples by reverse engineering
the training process. In the same way a classier’s weights are
updated to minimize its loss during training, adversarial aacks
seek to maximize a classiers’ loss by carefully altering images.
Adversarial examples are a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, they provide a unique angle for studying the learning process
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of neural networks. Because they allow us to follow the progression
of an image as it changes from one class to another, adversarial
examples can be helpful for understanding and interpreting decision
boundaries. is information can be used for building more accurate
classiers, and might enable model-based optimization [15].
On the other hand, adversarial examples pose a potentially ex-
istential threat to the safety of vision-dependent technologies. If
image classiers can be fooled, then so can the technologies that
use them. Adversarial aacks have already been experimented with
against self-driving cars and facial recognition authentication.
Adversarial training, the process of including adversarial ex-
amples in the training set, is one popular defense [5]. However,
while this technique has been shown to improve the robustness of a
classier against adversarial examples, the inclusion of adversarial
images in the training process weakens classiers’ accuracy on nat-
ural (unaltered) images [20] [16]. Building classiers that maintain
state-of-the-art accuracy on both natural and adversarial examples is
a key challenge in image classication, as a solution would provide
defense as well as insight into the nature of CNNs [20].
We present a simple solution: localized adversarial training
(LAT). LAT is a training tactic that focuses the classier on certain
regions in an image. Because CNNs’ weights are based on every
pixel of every training image, CNNs are frequently background-
focused [14]. By including adversarial backgrounds in the training
set, we train the model to focus on the object more than the back-
ground, in turn increasing the robustness of the classier on both
adversarial and natural examples. We successfully implemented
this strategy with the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, creating mod-
els that outperform a traditional classier. For the MNIST models,
the localized adversarial training decreased the accuracy loss by
4.35% on natural inputs and at least 99% on all aempted adversar-
ial inputs. For the CIFAR-10 models, loss decreased by 1.63% on
natural inputs and 15.98% on adversarial inputs.
1.1 Contributions
We rst show that image classiers may be unnecessarily depen-
dent on image backgrounds, then develop a technique that focuses
training on image foregrounds. Our contributions are as follows:
• We conduct, to our knowledge, the rst adversarial aack
that is restricted to making limited changes to only back-
ground pixels. We run this aack against Inception v3 on
nine images, bringing its accuracy to 0.00%.
• We implement a whitebox version of this aack against
an MNIST classier, bringing its accuracy from 99.19% to
0.08%, and against a CIFAR-10 model, bringing its accuracy
from 95.17% to 59.26%.
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• We design a new, localized adversarial training technique
that introduces adversarial backgrounds into training.
• We test our algorithm extensively on MNIST and CIFAR-
10. In contrast to most adversarial models, which perform
beer on adversarial examples and worse on natural ex-
amples, the locally adversarial models performed beer on
both.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines
related work on adversarial aacks. Section 3 discusses our unique
localized aack and benchmarks its eectiveness. In Section 4
we introduce our localized adversarial training process, and in
Section 5 we implement and evaluate this training process. Section
6 discusses potential challenges for future work, and Section 7 oers
our nal conclusions.
2 RELATEDWORKS
e observation that imperceptible changes could reliably fool
image classiers was rst made in 2014 [19]. More eective and
reliable aacks, such as FGSM [5] and PGD [7], were subsequently
introduced. PGD, one of the strongest white-box aacks against
CNNs [10], is the aack used in this paper. PGD aacks change
each pixel in order to maximize the loss of the classier, then ”clip”
the changes to ensure that no pixel changes more than a given
distance ϵ . It continues this process for a specied number of steps,
each time modifying the image slightly to increase the loss of the
classier on that image. Further optimization-based aacks have
been described [4][8], including localized adversarial aacks, or
aacks where only certain pixels are altered.
Such research has explored which pixels have the biggest impact
in creating adversarial examples [11], how many pixels must be
changed to fool a classier [13], whether a classier can be fooled
with a single pixel [17] or patch [3][6], and which pixels can be
changed the most while leaving the changes imperceptible to a
human [9]. e isolation of adversarial changes to a specic re-
gion allows for the testing of specic hypotheses. For instance,
using a localized aack to explore the weaknesses of deep neu-
ral networks[11] or the transferability of aacks in a black-box
seing[6]. Localized aacks are also relevant in real-world adver-
sarial aacks. Since an aacker can rarely alter an entire scene,
physical adversarial patches [3][7] oer a practical means to fool
an object detector or image classier. Defenses have also been
proposed for localized aacks [12].
3 LOCALIZED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON
BACKGROUND PIXELS
e localized aacks and defenses mentioned above and in Sec-
tion 2 all have one of two qualities: either they focus on pixels not
belonging to the object being detected, or they do not ”clip” their
changes to stay within a certain distance from the original image.
None of the aacks which leave the main object in the image unaltered
also limit the amount of noise that can be added to any other pixel.
In this sense, our aack is unique. We explore the eectiveness of
aacks that are localized to the background while still aempting
to restrict the perceptibility of the changes by constraining the
maximum alteration of any pixel.
To get a benchmark for whether or not localized and impercep-
tible adversarial aacks can be eective, we conduct a white-box
aack on an Inception v3 image classier [18]. We rst use Mo-
bileNet to create a bounding box suggestion around the object,
then use a PGD aack adapted from [2] to maximize the loss of
the classier on that image. By seing ϵ to zero for every pixel
inside the bounding box, we keep all pixels belonging to the object
unchanged and maximize the loss function only over the remaining
pixels.
We run this aack with nine 300x300 images on Inception v3,
and nd that the correct class was not in the top ten guesses for
any of the adversarial images, suggesting that this aack is indeed
eective. For these locally adversarial images, the classier’s con-
dence of the correct class is only .0002 on average, compared to the
original condence of .71 on the same natural inputs. Additionally,
we nd that about 49.1% of the pixels are changed. Because the
bounding-boxes are imperfect, a few of those pixels don’t belong
to the background and therefore would not be included in a pure
localized adversarial-background aack.
A few examples of the localized aack process are included in
Figure 1. e images on the le are the unaltered (and correctly
identied) images, the column in the middle is used for illustrat-
ing which pixels are altered, and the column on the right holds
the (incorrectly identied) localized adversarial examples, which
look almost identical to the images on the le but have adversarial
background pixels. e results of this experiment are summarized
in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the classier’s guesses and con-
dences for natural images, while Table 2 shows the same classier’s
guesses and condences for the locally adversarial examples gen-
erated by our aack. Although this particular aack was run on a
limited number of locally adversarial examples, we include them
as an illustration and use them as a benchmark to suggest the
sensitivity of classiers to changes in the background of an image.
Table 1: Inception v3 on unaltered inputs
Correct Class Percent ofPixels Altered correct guess? in top 5? in top 10? Classier Guess
Condence in
Correct Class
triceratops 0 1 1 1 triceratops 0.980953
tarantula 0 1 1 1 tarantula 0.957682
snail 0 1 1 1 snail 0.880702
bassoon 0 1 1 1 bassoon 0.748791
hammer 0 1 1 1 hammer 0.925929
iPod 0 1 1 1 iPod 0.982066
great white shark 0 1 1 1 great white 0.53433
hen 0 1 1 1 hen 0.380655
kite 0 0 0 0 umbrella 0.00108
Average 0 0.888889 0.888889 0.888889 0.710243
Table 2: Inception v3 on locally adversarial images
Correct Class Percent ofPixels Altered correct guess? in top 5? in top 10? Classier Guess
Condence in
Correct Class
triceratops 35.6 0 0 0 coral reef 0.000377
tarantula 61 0 0 0 wolf spider 4.44E-08
snail 70.7 0 0 0 bakery 2.42E-06
bassoon 28.3 0 0 0 electric fan 0.000657
hammer 15.5 0 0 0 hand blower 0.000389
iPod 70.3 0 0 0 paper towel 1.10E-07
great white shark 48 0 0 0 parachute 1.10E-07
hen 36.3 0 0 0 poer’s wheel 9.68E-05
kite 76 0 0 0 brain coral 6.02E-11
Average 49.07778 0 0 0 0.000169
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(a.1) Classication: Bassoon (.75 condence) (a.2) Bassoon (.54 condence) (a.3) Electric fan (.12 condence)
(b.1) Classication: Great White (.53 condence) (b.2) Great White (.63 condence) (b.3) Parachute (.99 condence)
Figure 1: Localized and Imperceptible Adversarial Attack. e rst image of each type is the unaltered, correctly identied
image. e second image has any pixel outside the bounding box as black. e third, and incorrectly identied, image of each
type has every pixel outside the bounding box as adversarial. e green bars represent correct guesses, and the height of each
bar indicates the classiers’ condence in that guess.
4 LOCALIZED ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Because adversarial aacks expose such a glaring weakness in tra-
ditional image classiers, it is prudent to judge the quality of a
classier not simply on its accuracy on natural inputs, but also on
its robustness when faced with adversarial inputs. One particu-
lar method of achieving robustness for a classier is adversarial
training. In this section, we introduce our new localized adversar-
ial training algorithm, which trains our classier to focus on the
foreground.
As mentioned in Section 1, a degree of robustness (as well as
extra regularization [5]) can be achieved by including adversarial
examples in the training process. Because a classier’s weights are
continually updated during training, adversarial training requires
that newly generated adversarial examples be introduced at every
step. is slowly trains the model to perceive adversarial examples
and natural examples the same way, making it more resistant to
unseen adversarial examples. However, despite the robustness of
adversarially trained models, they are generally outperformed on
natural inputs by their non-adversarially trained counterparts. is
tradeo is explained in [20] as a result of the fact that the most
accurate models rely on ”non-robust features,” or features that are
most subject to adversarial aacks. It is here that our localized
aacks become most relevant: if a model is adversarially trained to
discount irrelevant features (like the background, in many cases),
then it may become more robust to adversarial changes in those
features without suering the same accuracy loss of a standard
adversarially-trained model, which is trained to not rely heavily on
any feature. e details of this procedure are found in Algorithm 1.
As described in Algorithm 1, LAT iterates through small batches
of the training data, making each image in each batch adversar-
ial. For each image, a PGD aack generates and adds adversarial
perturbations. en, the aack is localized by creating a matrix of
equal size to the image, denoted as epmatrix , where each value is ϵ
if the corresponding pixel is altered, or zero otherwise. (In the next
Section, we will describe in detail the dierent localized attacks we
explored.) e adversarial image is then clipped, to ensure that its
distance from the original image at any given pixel is no more than
that pixel’s corresponding value in the epsilon matrix (meaning
that higher values of ϵ allow more visible changes at those pixels).
Finally, once all the images in a batch are adversarial, the neural
network is updated and trained to recognize those images correctly.
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Algorithm 1 Localized Adversarial Training
1: n is a CNN; ϵ is the maximum value that any pixel may legally
change; attack describes which pixels may legally change
2: repeat for each minibatch B in training data
3: repeat for each image in B
4: x ← imaдe
5: λ← PGD Aack (x ,n) . Noise generated by PGD
aack
6: x ′ ← x + λ
7: epmatrix is initialized
8: epmatrix ←Localize (epmatrix , ϵ,attack) . Changes
are localized
9: x ′ clipped to within x+epmatrix , x-epmatrix
10: replace original image in B with x ′
11: until every image in batch is altered
12: Train n on updated batch B
13: until training is complete
5 EVALUATION OF ROBUSTNESS AND
ACCURACY
To test the robustness and accuracy of locally adversarially trained
models, we train 3 CNN classiers each for the CIFAR-10 and MNIST
datasets. Each model is trained with two convolutional layers, a
fully connected layer, and an output layer, and undergoes 100,000
steps of training. e rst model for each dataset is a ”natural”
model, which is trained on unaltered images. e ”standard” model
is trained on standard, traditional adversarial images, with every
pixel altered. Finally, the ”background” model is trained on locally
adversarial images with the middle pixels unaltered. Each aack
is iterated over 100 steps, and ϵ is set to .3 for every pixel that is
allowed to change.
5.1 Experiment Results
Evaluating each of the three models on each of the three inputs
types yields a total of 9 results per model. e experiment con-
rms the trade-o between accuracy and robustness for standard
adversarial training: while the MNIST model trained with the stan-
dard aack suered at least 99% less loss than the naturally trained
model, it suered 39.9% more loss on natural inputs. Similarly,
while the CIFAR-10 standard adversarial model suered 95.7% less
loss on adversarial images, it suered 88.9% more loss on natural
images.
For both datasets, the ”background” models outperformed the
natural models, by 4.35% on natural MNIST inputs and over 99%
on adversarial MNIST inputs. e ”background” CIFAR-10 model
also had improved performance in both categories, by 1.63% on
natural inputs and 15.98% on adversarial inputs. Figure 2 describes
the loss of each model when tested on natural inputs and each
kind of adversarial input. Only the models which underwent LAT
outperformed the ”natural” model on all inputs.
6 DISCUSSION
We show that an MNIST and CIFAR-10 classier can be improved
with localized adversarial training. We also show the eectiveness
of localized adversarial aacks against complex, high-resolution
Figure 2: e cross entropy loss of each model on natural
inputs and each type of adversarial input. Loss on natural
inputs is scaled by a factor of 1000 for MNIST and 100 for
CIFAR-10.
image classiers like Inception v3. Although we did not use LAT for
more complex, higher-resolution image classiers, our success with
LAT on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 classiers, as well as with the
localized adversarial aack against Inception v3, indicates that LAT
is a promising next step to increase the accuracy and robustness of
those classiers as well. Because LAT can be implemented as a mod-
ication to preexisting adversarial training techniques, the main
challenge for LAT is identifying which pixels should be changed.
While it is computationally inexpensive to use semantic segmen-
tation or foreground/background segregation on a low-resolution,
black-and-white dataset like MNIST, it is much more computation-
ally expensive to identify background pixels on high-resolution
color images. A much cheaper approach is to leave the middle
pixels unaltered, which, although eective in our experiment, may
not yield the same benets as a more exact masking approach when
used on complex, high-resolution classication. Still, either strategy
could still lead to improved accuracy on natural inputs compared to
traditional adversarial training. Finally, we suggest that LAT may
be an eective tool to combat bias in deep learning. We used it to
prevent image classiers from focusing on the background, but it
could just as easily be used to prevent a risk-calculator from focus-
ing on elements like race or skin-color. We leave these applications
for future work.
7 CONCLUSION
We conclude that CNN classiers are oen too sensitive to changes
in the background, and that this can be addressed by including im-
ages with adversarial backgrounds in the training set. is focuses
the training on the image foregrounds, increasing accuracy and
robustness. Localized adversarial training is cheap to implement
and could have broad applications.
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